"If the dollar is going to he dethroned... it will be as a result of the burgeoning resentment felts towards the United States across the world."
In in the near-term due to significant inertia in financial markets, the possibility becomes more probable as the time horizon is extended and political considerations are factored in. The effects of a switch are difficult to predict, but it would make the U.S. economy more susceptible to exchange rate volatility, hinder U.S. borrowing, and could even provide a shock to the international monetary system strong enough to usher in an era of monetary bipolarity or even euro dominance.
OIL MARKETS AND THE DOLLAR
Oil exporters are unlikely to mobilize to change the currency denomination of oil to euros in the short-term, because of the structure and inertia inherent in oil markets and the euro's continued second tier status to the dollar.
First, oil markets are highly institutionalized. A change in the currency used to price oil would require collective action by the largest producers, since the system in place for pricing oil is an interconnected global market.
The oil pricing system is often misunderstood. News reports sometimes confuse or gloss over the distinction between requiring payment in euros and pricing oil in euros.
For instance, Saddam's Iraq did not price oil in euros; it simply accepted payment in that currency for contracts that were priced in dollars. This option is unattractive for most producers because it increases their exposure to "currency risk"-essentially shifting the volatility from the buyer to the producer. 5 " 11 Currently, once a contract is negotiated, the producer is guaranteed a payment in dollars at the end of an agreed upon period, commonly thirty days. Thus, the buyer carries the currency risk by assuming responsibility for changing currency into dollars to pay the producer at the end of the term.
producers do hold the significant "power to make major changes." xv The catch is they cannot act alone. It would take a coordinated effort of the majority of producers to effect a switch. Even OPEC does not have this weight on its own, as it amounts to about one-third of global production. If one country-even a large one-attempted to establish its own oil market, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has suggested, it would be unsuccessful. The problem is that arbitrage would occur between markets
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The new market would mirror the established dollar denominated markets, but there would be much greater volatility as price shifts would follow changes in the exchange rate. This volatility would largely cancel the principal benefit of pricing in euros: price stability.
Finally, oil exporters will give the euro time to mature before making a decision on whether or not to support euro pricing. Addressing the current state of the euro, Yarjani says that OPEC is "assessing how the euro will settle into its life as a new currency." 50 ' 11 Currently, more than two-thirds of the world's currency reserves are held in dollars, while about 15 percent are held in euros. The euro however has been increasing its share every year at the dollar's expense.
LONG SHOT: THE PROSPECTS OF EURO PRICING IN OIL MARKETS
The euro's advantages and disadvantages aside, the cur- (2003) ii Interestingly, independent news organizations, internet message boards, and even some foreign newspapers as reputable as the Guardian and the Hindu have printed pieces arguing that Saddam's announcement was the real reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. See Chapman (2004) and Rajaram (2003) iii Panicker (2003) iv Mabro (2000) v Mabro (2000) vi Horsnell (2000) vii Other grades are assigned prices "using complex formulas derived from marker crudes." See Yarjani (2002) . viii Horsnell (2000) ix Bergsten (2002) Levy (1988), p. 666 xxiv Javad Yarjani, the head of OPEC's research arm, is quoted extensively in this paper, but his analysis should be qualified by noting that he does not account for the substantial political dimension of the issue. Speaking as the head of OPEC's Petroleum Market Analysis Department, he is approaching the question from a rational economic perspective which may not be wholly consistent with the perspective of OPEC's more political leaders. The scapegoat theory explains an exception to the assumption of state-level rationality. See Yarjani (2002) 
